This book is a rich blend of analyses by leading experts from various cultures and disciplines. A compact introduction to a complex field, it illustrates biotechnology's profound impact upon the environment and society. Moreover, it underscores the vital relevance of cultural values. This book empowers readers to more critically assess biotechnology's value and effectiveness within both specific cultural and global contexts.

BackgroundExercise is primarily sustained by energy derived from lipids, and glucose. Substrate utilization is the pattern by which these fuel sources are used during activity. There are many factors that influence substrate utilization. We aim to delineate the effect of exercise intensity and body composition on substrate utilization.ObjectiveThe objective of our study was to discern the differences in substrate utilization profiles during a maximal and submaximal graded exercise test, and to determine the extent to which body composition influences substrate utilization (...) during the exercise tests.MethodsA total of 27 male athletes, 32.5 ± 11 years of age, were recruited for this study. Body composition was analyzed using a bioelectrical impedance analyzer. Maximal and submaximal exercise tests were performed on a treadmill. A novel graded submaximal treadmill protocol was used for the submaximal test.ResultsAverage percent body fat was 15.8 ± 5%. Average maximal oxygen consumption was 47.6 ± 9 mL/kg/min, while the average exercise intensity at which participants were shifting to glucose predominance for energy during the maximal and submaximal tests were 76 ± 8.3% and 58.4 ± 21.1%, respectively. A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare percent VO2max at crossover point in maximal and submaximal graded exercise tests. There was a significant difference in percent VO2max at the crossover point for maximal and submaximal tests. A linear regression was performed to elucidate the interaction between exercise intensity at the crossover point and body composition during a maximal and submaximal graded exercise test. There was a significant effect of PBF on percent VO2max at crossover point during the maximal graded exercise test [F = 9.10, P = 0.006] with an R2 of 0.245. However, there was no significant effect of PBF on percent VO2max at crossover point during the submaximal graded exercise test.ConclusionSubstrate utilization, represented by the crossover point, is dependent on the rate of increase in exercise intensity. At maximal efforts, the crossover to carbohydrates from fats as the predominant fuel source occurs at a significantly later stage of percent VO2max than at submaximal efforts. Furthermore, body composition represented by PBF is a significant predictor of substrate utilization during maximal efforts. Athletes with a relatively higher PBF are more likely to have increased lipid oxidation during high intensity exercises than those with a lower body fat percentage. (shrink)

In medieval writers an important distinction was drawn between two applications of the term ‘logica’: there was logica utens, the practice of thinking logically about this or that subject-matter, and there was logica docens, the construction of logical theory. Of course the English word ‘logic’ and its derivative ‘logical’ have a corresponding twofold meaning, and we ignore the distinction at the risk of serious confusion. ‘Logical thought’ may mean thinking that is being commended as orderly, consistent, and consequent, whatever its (...) subject-matter; or it may mean the thinking of logicians about logic, which alas has not always exhibited these virtues. Similarly for ‘teaching logic’: there is trying to get people, by precept and example, to be orderly, consistent, and consequent in their thinking, and there is the endeavour to train logicians for the next generation. In any respectable philosophy department there will be someone teaching logic in the first sense; in my own university there are very many first-year undergraduates who do a course called Reason and Argument with this aim. But we hold that the teacher of such logica utens must himself have a sufficient skill in logica docens if he is to do his job properly; and we undertake the further task of training people in logical theory so that some of them, who have sufficient native ability and motivation, may take up the torch from their teachers. (shrink)

Both the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Redundancy/Performative Theory of Truth appear to be unquestionably correct and yet each seems to be inconsistent with the other. As a result we have a puzzle. The way out of this dilemma is to be found by taking a closer look at the role that ‘Is’ and its cognates play in the structure of the standard statement. Once this is done it can be seen that both theories are compatible with one another.

A subject such as the present one, covering as it does most of the philosophies of the East and West, is so encompassing that one can mention all the philosophers seriously concerned with it only with difficulty. The issues deriving from our subject are also numerous; and every earnest philosopher who attempts to understand Being and its relations to Becoming and Essence faces one of the most complex of philosophic problems. Unless one is satisfied with dictionary meanings of these terms, (...) one is taken, as it were, beyond thought or at least to the limits of thought. Even if one understands Being, Becoming, and Essence through the familiar formula that x becomes y through the act of Becoming by incorporating some Essence, one finds oneself perplexed in attempting to relate the formula to our common experiences. (shrink)

The problem of the individual has had both logical and metaphysical interest and is as old as Plato in the West and Gautama and Kanäda in the East. It is still a controversial problem for logicians and metaphysicians alike, and is now-a-days complicated by the change in meaning and also by the inherent ambiguity of the terms individual and particular.

Gareth Evans's two articles on the syntax and semantics of pronouns unfortunately seem to have been written far more with the desire of showing Peter Geach to have been wrong all along the line than in an endeavour to formulate, clearly and coherently, a comprehensive theory of his own. Some scattered passages of constructive theorizing there are, and in the latter part of this note I shall have something to say about them; but the controversial motive prevails.It would be wearisome (...) for me, and unrewarding for readers, if I were to work through Evans's arguments against me in detail: his misrepresentations of me are frequent and gross, and exposure of them in detail, together with restatement of the arguments misrepresented, would take up many more pages than the articles themselves. I here document just two of the more flagrant examples; with this warning before their eyes, readers may be disposed not to believe Evans's account of my works without checking for themselves. (shrink)

Students of the Orestes are fortunate to have two excellent commentaries at their disposal, by C. W. Willink and M. L. West . Neither will help them to understand this line, which is ‘the only allusion to Ganymede's horsemanship’ , because ‘no story of riding by Ganymede is known’ . But we are repeatedly reminded that the scene with the Phrygian has far fewer affinities with tragedy than with comedy, and εριπιδαριστοφαíζεται Comedy provides the clue, specifically at Ar. Vesp. 50If. (...) and Lys. 676ff. The reference is to the variety of equestrianism for which Ganymede is far from unknown . For Innoavvr) here describes a σχμα ρωτικóν and the line means Ganymedes concubinus, Iovis supini inguini insidens et equitans, sc. inter causas fuit malorum propter Iunonis invidiam Troianis immissorum. (shrink)

Philosophers are inclined to raise philosophical dust by asking such questions as, what relations must exist between two body occurrences for them to be body occurrences of the same body? or what relation among person-stages makes them stages of the same person? and then complain that they cannot see the answers. I want to argue that the reason they cannot see the answers is that these questions and others like them are misconceived.

I welcome the invitation of Eugene Freeman to contribute a paper on the subject of self, giving my own views. I have been devoted to comparative philosophy all my life, and I am naturally greatly influenced by Indian and Western thought. But I should warn both the Indian and Western readers against equating my views in their entirety with any of the past philosophies. It is also not possible to given an exhaustive theory of the self in a paper of (...) the present size. What is not given here may place my view in a wrong light and the reader may draw wrong conclusions. (shrink)

"No other work treating Indian philosophy on a comparable scale contains the illuminating comparisons between doctrines of Indian schools and the thought of Western philosophy ranging from Plato to Sartre and Wittgenstein...It will, moreover, contribute to the understanding of Western philosophy by Indian thinkers and vice versa...Raju has an intimate acquaintance with a remarkable range of Western thinkers and this distinguishes his work from most of what has gone before...Raju, moreover, is himself a critical thinker and consequently, although he has (...) written a history, he treats the ideas and doctrines in a philosophical mode and his assessments of positions are often original and illuminating." -- John E. Smith, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University "Purpose: To deal with Indian philosophy in a fashion reflecting the way the best German historians of philosophy deal with Western philosophy...The book is remarkable for its comprehensiveness in combination with extensive critical discussions...Raju's book...is more critical than Radhakrishnan's and more philosophical than Dasgupta's. Radhakrishnan's comments are far less philosophically sophisticated and interesting than Raju's....a monument to a senior Indian philosopher's lifelong study and thoughtful critical consideration of the great classical systems of his tradition." -- Karl H. Potter, Professor of Philosophy, University of Washington "Raju's credentials are impeccable. He is one of the few scholars in the world who could presume to write a major work on Indian thought. Accordingly, his knowledge of the Indian schools is accurate and impressive. To the extent that one of his intentions is to cast those schools in terms which make them more intelligible to western readers, his work measures up very well." -- Harold H. Oliver, Professor of Philosophy, Boston University. (shrink)

On the very first page of Spinoza's Ethics we find the perplexing definition of ‘attribute’: ‘By an attribute I mean what the understanding perceives in regard to a substance as constituting its essence’. Each attribute of a substance by itself thus constitutes the essence of a substance; if there are many attributes of the same substance, it does not take all of them together to constitute its essence. Spinoza, as we all know, in fact held that there is only one (...) substance, God, but there are infinitely many attributes, of which only two, Thought and Extension, are accessible to the human mind. Each attribute, we further learn, has to be conceived on its own account ; being conceived on its own account is, however, a distinguishing mark of the one substance, so how is it that the many attributes, which Spinoza says are really distinct, are not so many distinct substances, so many gods? That is the ontological side of the puzzle. Now for the logical or grammatical side — about which writers on Spinoza have, I think, said a great deal less, though it has been much discussed as regards less deviant theology than Spinoza's. Each attribute is clearly meant to be a concrete, active, individual entity; yet the attributes are designated by abstract nouns — ‘Thought’ and ‘Extension’. Now can we make sense of such a sentence as ‘God is Thought’ or ‘God is Extension’, as opposed to ‘God thinks’ or ‘God is extended’? What does it mean to predicate an abstract noun of a concrete individual? And if this ‘is’ here is not a bare copula of predication but an identity sign, then how can we avoid passing from ‘God is Thought’ and ‘God is Extension’ to ‘Thought is Extension’? Spinoza would deny the conclusion, and it is quite essential to his system to do so. For if Thought just is Extension, identically so, then any mode of the attribute Thought is a mode of the attribute Extension and vice versa. But for Spinoza, the last is diametrically opposite to the truth: no mode is a mode of more than one attribute, and indeed no causal relations link modes of different attributes — a causal linkage is always confined to one attribute. (shrink)

The article is a reply to criticisms made by r m martin of the author's article "designation and truth." he claims that martin failed to observe that he was "attempting a reductio ad absurdum," and therefore, His conclusions about the author's article were misguided. (staff).